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"All the riches of English literature are ours. English authorship comes 
free as the vital aiJ:, untaxed, unhindered, even by the necessity of transla-
tion, into our country; and the question is, Shall we tax it, and thus inter-
pose a barrier to the circul ation of intellectual and moral light? Shall we 
build up a dam, to obstruct the flow of the rivers of knowledge? . . . Shall 
we refuse to gather the share of this harvest, which Providence, and our 
own position, makes our own?"2 
Taken from a memorial presented to the Congress on June 13, 1842, by 
the Philadelphia law-book publishers T. & J.W. Johnson, this opinion 
illustrates a common attitude among Nineteenth-century U.S. publishers: 
piracy was simply considered a perfectly valid means to a highly desir-
able end. The protracted congressional debate regarding possible adhe-
sion to emerging international conventions on intellectual property rights 
was fueled by heated opinions for or against such a step. Those in favor 
were concerned that by its failure to protecl authorship, the U.S . ri sked 
1. T his paper is based on a chapter in my forthcoming book No Trespassing: Authorship. Intellectual Pro-
perly Rights, and 1he Boundaries of Glohali:latio n (Toromo: University of Toron10 Press, 2003). 
2. Quoted in Thorvald Solberg, !11rem a1io11al Copyrigltr in tlte Congress of the United Stales , 1837-1886 
(Boston: Press of Rockwell and Churchill, 1886), JO. 
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becoming "the literary Ishmael of the civilized world,"3 while those in 
the opposite camp primarily launched the ir counterarguments on behalf 
of a growing publishing industry and the need to ensure democratic 
accessibility of cheap books to the American audience.4 
Clearly, the perspective of the U.S. at this time is that of a developing 
nati on, bent on safeguarding its own industry at all cost. If any sort of reg-
ulation was to be implemented, prices would go up, publishers and book-
sellers go bankrupt, and the ongoing process of democratization in the vast 
country be undone, or so the argument went. Those who launched such a 
viewpoint onen did so in a rebellious tone that comes across indicating a 
very conscious payback by a former colony on its ex-masters. To T. & J.W. 
Johnson, English literature represented indeed a common cultural source, 
one that the previously oppressed now had every right to exploit in order 
to further their own agenda of independence. 
As John Tebbel suggests in his monumental expose on the history of 
American publishing, international copyrigh t would most li kely have 
been a hindrance to book publishing in the U.S. had it been enacted 
before the Civil War.5 Instead, popular novels were reprinted without 
rights being bo ught or authors receiving any compensation; an acti vity 
completely above board since U.S. copyright law only protected do-
mestic writers. Interestingly enough, this did not apply to T he Prov isional 
Congress of the Confederacy, which in an 1861 act extended copyrights 
to citizens of any foreign state or power.6 West & Johnston, one of the 
South 's leading publishing houses at that time, even accused the "Yankee 
swindlers" of robbing foreign authors of the frui ts of their labor, but 
added that fortunately such disgraceful proceedings were not part of 
Southern practice or legislation.7 
3. Report of the Hon. W.F.. Simonrls, of Conneticul. from the House Committee on Patents. June IO. 1890, 
in Haven Putnam, The Q11estio11 of Copyright: A S1111111U11:J' of the Copyright Lllll'S m Prese111 in Force i11 the 
Chief Co1111tries <~lthe World (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 189 1), 12 1. 
4. Senate representative Wi ll iam C. Preston, of South Carolina, put it bluntly: "Great Britain .. . had two 
authors tu our one, and was, therefore, more interested in the protection of mental labor; while the United 
States published three or four times as many books, anti, therefore, more interested in protecting publ ishers ... 
William C. Preston quoted in Solberg, /111emalio11a/ Copyright, 4. 
5. John Tebbel, A liisto1 y of Book P11bli.l'hi11g i11 the United Stales: \lo/11111e II: '/'lie Erpm1sio11 of rm l11d11 -
st1y 1865-1919 (New York: Bowker, 1975), 64 1. 
6 . John Tebbel, A liistmy of Book P11blishi11g i11 the U11ited Swtes: Vul11111e I: '/lie Creation of 1111 l11d11s/I)' 
1630-1865 (New York: Bowker, 1975), 561. 
7. Tebbel, Creation <!f'a11 !nd11s11y, 56 I. 
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During most of the Twentieth Century, U.S . copyright policy demon-
strates a strong protectionist slant that relied on the implementation of 
several complicated formalities, all of which would effectively bar the 
U.S. from coming into compliance with international copyright conven-
tions. The most contentious of these was the "manufacturing clause" that 
remained in place up until the U.S. joined the Berne Convention in 1986, 
and which called for manufacturing in the U.S . or Canada in order to 
qualify for copyright. Not being a signatory did not hinder the U.S. from 
using Canada as a convenient loophole (Canada had joined Berne in 
1928) to secure protection under the convention by publi shing first edi -
tions simultaneously in both countries, what was referred to as the so-
called "back door to Berne."8 
I 
Let us now step into the time machine and press the button on warp speed 
for the 1970s, when access to information and knowledge was to become 
an increasingly global, increasingly interconnected, and increasingly 
polarized question. During this decade, many recently decolonized na-
tions viewed intell ectual property rights with skeptici sm, if not downright 
hostility. Successfully establishing questions relating to North-South 
inequality primarily on the UN agenda, the one vote, one nation system 
provided Least Developed Countries with a far more sympathetic venue in 
which to launch their concerns than the weighted vote in the International 
Monetary Fund or The World Bank allowed for. In order to comply with 
existing international intellectual property treaties, developing nations 
used almost the exact same line of argument as the Philadelphia publishers 
did a century before them: if they were to have any chance of coming up to 
speed with the developed world and building the infrastructure of the 
Information Age, some sort of special provisions were called for. Working 
to achieve a New International Economic Order (NIEO), developing 
nations were boosted in their efforts by the apparent success of The Orga-
8. See Pau l Goldstein, In1ema1io11a/ Copyright: Principles, I.aw, a11d Praclice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 189-196. for a longer discussion on U.S. pre-Berne policies. 
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nization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), whose com-
modity leverage during the oil-crisis of the 1970s raised hopes in some 
quarters and fear in others that power of this kind could spawn equally 
successful constellations elsewhere.9 Cul minating in the work of the Inter-
national Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, 
UNESCO promoted the idea that economy and information were two con-
cepts of equal standing, deeply enmeshed and interdependent When Lhe 
commission in 1980 published its findings in the controversial Many 
Voices, One World: Communication and Society Today and Tomorrow: 
Towards a New More Just and More Efficient World Information and 
Communication Order (often referred to as the McBride Report, after 
Sean MacBride, chairman of the commission) it stressed that the two 
major programs of NIEO and NWICO (New World Information and Com-
munication Order) had to be considered together and that information as 
well as more tangible riches should be considered a common heritage in 
need of equitable distribution , even suggesting that concrete plans of 
action linking both processes should be implemented within the United 
Nations system. 10 The U.S. however, reacted strongly to the MacBride 
report and left the organization in 1984 because of UNESCO's alleged 
politicization. fn the end, a combination of internal and external factors -
failure to rally a unified front paired with accelerating transnational flows 
of an increasingly immaterial and informational, rather than commodity-
based nature - made it clear that the NIEO and NWICO would fail, and as 
we shall see later, the issue of intellectual property rights wou ld instead 
begin to move into a different arena than that of UNESCO. 
I have framed my argument within these two seemingly incommensu-
rable temporal markers for several reasons. One: i t ill ustrates the U.S . 
propensity to stand "outside" the agenda set by the international commu-
nity at certain key moments; two: it demonstrates the tremendous histor-
9. Susan K. Se ll, Power and Ideas. North-South Politic.1· of /111ellect11al Property and Antitmst (New York: 
SUNY, 1998), 29-31 , 73. Chapte r one in Se ll 's book, ;>Power anti Ttlcas," 9-40, provides a comprehensive 
introduction to the North-South d ichotomy in matters or intellectual properly rights. For another overview of 
the pros and cons of stronger intellectual propeny protection on part of Lhc Least Developed Coumries , see 
Carlos Alberto Primo Braga, "The Economics nf Inte ll ectual Property Rights and the GAlT: A View r rom the 
South," Vanderbilr Journal ofTra11.matio11al law 22 ( 1989), 243-264. 
10. UNESCO, Many Voices, One World: Cn11111111nicatio11 mu! Society Today and Tomonvw: Towards a 
New More J11st and More 1;{ficie111 World !11.Jumwtion and Co1111111111icatio11 Order (Paris : UNESCO. 1980), 
268, at 68. 
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ical shift in the U.S. position vis-a-vis international intellectual property 
ri ghts, which is the one that recasts the nation from being a developing or 
importing one, to being a developed and exporting one, and finall y, three: 
it introduces the question to what extent we might describe the current 
status of intellectual property rights in the global, knowledge-based 
society as being "Americanized." 
II 
Intellectual property rights are important because they safeguard what 
makes the wheels of the information society turn: culture, information, 
knowledge, or, in other words resources "of the mind." Making these 
rights into explicit policy is however a fairly new phenomenon in the 
U.S., and it is precisely the structural sea change of the global economy 
that made it possible. Interconnected, technology-driven, and above all, 
knowledge-based, this economy was stimulated by products the U.S. had 
or could manufacture plenty of in elite universities, research parks, or 
Hollywood studios, and subsequently, U.S. companies were likely to 
benefit from the deregulation of global markets and the increase in 
transnational trade, whether their business was in pharmaceuticals, soft-
ware, or sitcoms. As a major exporter of intellectual property products -
be they patented or copyrighted - two simultaneous market movements 
further underwrote the drift towards increased emphasis on global pro-
teclion: at home, domestic markets were in some cases nearing satura-
tion; abroad, foreign markets represented the potential for substantial 
new revenues, but on the downside many of these provided inadequate 
intellectual property protection . 
As a consequence, U.S. business interests resolutely rallied around the 
cause of international intellectual property rights, demonstrated in part by 
the launch of organizations such as The International Intellectual Prop-
c1ty Alliance (IIPA) in 1984. IIPA claims that those industries who 
"create copyrighted materials as their primary product,"11 continue to be 
11 . Stephen E. Siwek, "Execmive Summary,'· The International lntellecnial Property Alliance, Copyright 
/nd11s1ries i11 t/1e U.S. Eco110111y - The 2002 Report (Washington: Economists Incorporated, 2002), 3. 
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one of the fastest growing segments of the U.S economy, and that the 
annual growth of these so-called "core copyright industries," has been 
more than twice that of the economy as a whole. 12 According to IIPA the 
foreign sales/exports of these corporations - growing from $36 billion in 
1991 to $89 billion in 2001 13 - exceed almost all other major sectors in 
the U.S . economy, including aircrafts, cars, and chemicaJs.14 Because this 
industry represents such a vital segment of the U.S. economy, any poten-
tial loss due to unauthorized use - estimated in HPA's "2002 'Special 
301 ' Recommendations" at $838 billion in 2001 - indicates considerable 
adverse effects. 15 Another member of IIPA, The Business Software 
Alliance, put the world piracy rate at 37 percent in 2000, predicted their 
loss for that year at $11.75 billion, 16 and concluded in a survey together 
with the Software and Information Industry Association (SIIA) released 
in 1999, that the U.S . and Canada were the two nations most severely hit 
by piracy, leading every other world region with 26 percent of the total. 17 
Not until the mid-1980s would a revamped trade policy put an end to 
the more ad hoc approach favored up until then and secure intellectual 
property ri ghts the fulJ attention of the U.S. government. The financial 
importance of copyright in relation to the export industry had created a 
"copyright super lobby" in Washington, whose concerns fell on the 
favorable ears of industry-insider-incumbent President Ronald Reagan. ix 
His era of liberalization and deregulation could not have provided a 
better climate in which to fortify the connection between trade and intel-
lectual property, laying the foundation for what appears to be a strong bi-
partisan consensus in support of intellectual property as the "engine 
driving U.S. economy into the 2 1st century." 19 
12. l bid., 4. 
13. [bid .. 24. 
14. lbid., 5. 
15. The International Intellectual Properly Alliance, "2002 ·s pecia l 30 1' Recommendations." (Was-
hington: JJPA, 2002), 2. 
16. Business Software Alliance, Sixth l\11111ial BSA Global Snftll'are Piracy Study. (Washington: BSA. 
2001 ), 1. 
17. Software and lnfonnation Industry Association. Press rele<ise. "Five Years: $59.2 Billion Lost, .. (Was-
hington: SHA, May 24. 2000). 
18. For a longer account of these lobby strategie s, sec Jeremy Tunstall and David Machin, The A11glo-
A111erica11 Media Co1111ectio11 (Oxl'ord: Oxford University Press, 1999), esp. 40-52. 
19. Bruce Lehman, "The United States and the Glohal Inte llectual Property System: Leadership and 
Responsibili ties," (Washinglon: ln1erna1ional lnlellectual Properly lns1i1u1e, June I, 200 I), available at . 
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One of the most important instruments securing thi s policy is Section 
301 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1974 giving the President the right to 
enforce U.S. interests in trade agreements, and allowing industries, trade 
associations, and individuals to petition the United States Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR) if they feel that U.S. commerce is somehow jeopar-
dized by unfair practices and piracy. Established in 1962, the USTR is 
chief trade negotiator for the United States and its representative in major 
international trade organizations. In a 1984 amendment by Congress, the 
USTR's authority was extended so that it could initiBte cases on its own 
accord and second, for the first time, failure to adequately protect intel-
lectual property was deemed actionable . Today, the USTR is not only 
permitted to identify unfair practices, but can now also introduce trade 
sanctions as retaliatory measures in response to insufficient intellectual 
property protection. Under "Special 301" and "Super 301" the USTR 
must annually identify intellectual property priority countries, thirty days 
after which the agency must self-initiate an investigation, determine if 
action is warranted, and what sort of action is to be taken.20 In the 2002 
'Special 301' report issued by the USTR, Ukraine is designated Priority 
Foreign Country for the second year running, with an estimated level of 
piracy of 80 percent in the category Motion Pictures (down from 99 per-
cent in 2000) and 85 percent in Records and Music (down from 95 per-
cent in 2000); numbers leading to continued U.S. sanctions - valued at 
$75 million - that were initially imposed on Ukrainian products in Jan-
uary 2002.2 1 Together with the so-called Generalized System of Prefer-
ences (GSP), which accords preferential duty-free entry into the U.S. 
market for about 140 designated beneficiary countries and ten-itories, the 
U.S. enacted between 1984- 1988 a powerful set of trade instruments 
which could act as leverage in order to ensure and enforce the interests of 
20. My account of the role of the USTR draws substantially on SelJ, Pmver a11d Ideas, 133- 136. See also 
Bernard M. Hockman and Michel M. Kostecki, 711e Political Eco110111y '!{ the World Trading System: From 
GAT/' to WTO (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 147. Ronald Bettig claims that the U.S. government 
has used three for ms of leverage to eradicate piracy: bilateral trade leveraging against countries where piracy 
was rumpant: free trudc agreements with selected pal'lners inclusive of intellectual property protection; and 
multilateral efforts including U.S observance of the Berne convention. Ronald V. Bettig, Copyrighting C11/-
111re: 'f11e Polit ica l Hcmwmy of lntel/e('/l/a/ Property (Houlder: West.view Press, 1996), 198. 
2 1. USTR. 2002 Special 301 Report (Washington: USTR, 2002), available at hnp·Uwww.ustr.govLreports/ 
2002/soecial301 -rcoon PDE. 
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the core copyright industries in an increasingly global and interconnected 
economy. 
The principal venue for the implementation of these policies would be 
a very specific international forum: GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade). Drawing on the close industry-government liaison, compa-
nies such as CBM, General Electric, and Disney worked hard to ensure 
that intellectual property became an important part of the final GAIT 
round in 1986-1994,22 a comprehensive tactic Peter Drahos describes as 
leading up to the global period in intellectual property regulation.23 As 
the so-called Uruguay round drew to a close and GATT turned into The 
World Trade Organ ization (WTO), anxious voices were heard for the fate 
of developing nations, arguing tha t they should do their outmost to ensure 
that intellectual property rights were not inserted and institutionalized 
into formalized trade regimes.24 One concern was the possibility that 
such steps would only further cement the division between those who 
were "informatio n rich" and those who were "infonnation poor." The 
formation of the WTO in 1995 led to the most important agreement in 
intellectual property rights since the 1886 Berne Convention, namely the 
Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS). The TRIPS agreement, which is Annex 1 C of the Final Act, has 
a unique position within the WTO context because it imposes obligations 
upon govern ments to adhere to specific policies.25 Any nati on that is a 
part of the WTO, and that includes the vast majority of nations, must 
automatically comply with the standards of TRIPS or face possible trade 
sanctions or other retaliatory measures. Like no other treaty on intellec-
tual property TRIPS has unequ ivocally strengthened the connection 
between trade and intellectual property rights, and it has done so on a 
22. See Michael I'. Ryan. K1101vledge Dip/omncy: Global Co111petitio11 a11d the Politics of lmellect11a/ Pm-
perry (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), esp. 67-89, for a longer account of these events. 
23. Peter Drahos. 'Thinking Strategically About Intellectual Property Rights," Te/eco1111111111icatirms 
Policy 21, 3 ( 1997), 202. Drahos refers to the two previous periods as the territorial and the international. 
24. Chakravanhi Raghavan, Reco/011iwrio11: (;ATT. rlre Urng11ay Ro1111d & rile Third World (London: Zed 
Books, 1990), 59. 
25. This is different rrom both GATT and another WTO agreement. the General Agreement on Tracie in 
Services (GATS), consisting instead of agrccmems 1101 10 use specific po licies. Hockman and Kostecki, Tire 
Poliricol Eco110111y of r/1e World Trndi11g Sy.\'/e111 , 144. 
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truly global scale, making it, according to one critic, "one of the most 
effective vehicles of Western imperialism in history."26 
III 
In what sense may we then talk of these developments as an expression 
of "Americanization," rather than merely the logical result of a general 
and global spread of a market economy that no longer "belongs" to any 
individual nation-state? During the Uruguay round it became clear that a 
decisive reconfiguration of the world economy had taken place - from 
industrial to informational production - and that prosperity in this new 
co-dependent economy primarily was an issue of access to and participa-
tion in global trade flows. Those who for whatever reason did not or 
could not trade were almost ce1tain to be left behind. While organizations 
profoundly critical of the present world trade system acknowledge that 
history makes a mockery of the claim that trade cannot work for the poor, 
they also conclude that the current system is built on "rigged rules and 
double standards," both of which favor developed nations.27 Therefore is 
it quite possible, as Ruth Gana Okediji claims, that weaknesses of the 
free trade model are negatively reinforced by weaknesses in the intellec-
tual property model, and that this will hit developing countries especially 
hard.28 
Cast in the role as the only remaining superpower post-1989 has meant 
a privileged position for the U.S. in a number of converging fields. In a 
simultaneous movement, we witnessed how intellectual property rights 
became an issue with global implications. I would argue that it is 
irrefutable that the U.S. very successfully has transplanted essentially 
domestic policies into global truths, a project with distinct universalizing 
26. Marci A. Hamilton, "The TRIPS Agreement: IJnpcrialisric, Outdated, and Overprotective," in lnte/le-
ct11cil Property: Moral, l egal, and Intemational Dilemmas, ed. Adam D. Moore (Lanham: Rowman & Liule-
fic ld, L 997), 243. 
27. Oxfam, Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalization, and the Fight Against Poverty, 
(Oxford: Oxfam 2002), available al http '//www.makelradefair or~/styleshecl.a sp?fi lc=03042002 154 154 
28. Rurh Gana Okediji, "Copyright and Welfare in Global Perspective," Indiana Jo11rnal of Global l egal 
Studies 7 (Fall J 999), 134. 
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dimensions. This feature is particularly obvious within the framework of 
the WTO and TRIPS, where we see not only a stronger bond between 
trade and intellectual property rights than we have before, but also have 
come to accept threat of, or actual trade sanctions, as weapons in cases of 
non-compliance. The U.S. is not the only nation-state benefiting from 
this scenario, but it has been a strong advocate for its general applica-
bility and continues to be a dominating force in setting the perimeters of 
these global norms. In addition, in leaving UNESCO and choosing other 
combat zones, the U.S. has steered the battle of intellectual property 
rights away from being waged in the U.N. system and instead squarely 
placed it within WTO and TRIPS. Bo th these structural tendencies, I sug-
gest, represent a form of "Americanization" of intellectual property 
rights and of our understanding of the best way these rights should be 
managed. However, while in a much less encompassi ng manner, the 
same strategy was used by the leading exporter of cultural goods and the 
leading proponent for international intellectual property rights at the end 
of the Nineteenth century: France. A history lesson of this kind should 
lead us to recognize and question structural power wherever we see it, but 
also remind us that power itself is a profoundly impermanent thing. 
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